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MEASURING PEARSON IN THE CIRCUITS 
Ted Sampsell-Jones* & Jenna Yauch**
INTRODUCTION 
 
Qualified immunity analysis is divided into two prongs:  a merits prong, 
which considers whether a constitutional right was violated, and an 
immunity prong, which considers whether the officer’s conduct was entitled 
to qualified immunity.1  Even if an officer’s conduct violates a 
constitutional right, qualified immunity protects him from civil liability if 
the right was not so clearly established that it would have been clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.2
In 2001, in Saucier v. Katz,
 
3 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court required 
that these two prongs be analyzed in the “proper” order.4  Courts first had to 
determine whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right, 
and then decide whether that right was clearly established.5  This sequential 
determination was intended to further the development of the law—or 
rather, to prevent courts from depriving the law of explication of 
constitutional rights.6  The Saucier approach to qualified immunity largely 
reflected the approach advocated by our co-panelist Dean John Jeffries in 
his seminal article The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law.7
Eight years later in Pearson v. Callahan,
 
8 however, the Court retreated 
from Saucier.9  Another unanimous court held that the Saucier order was no 
longer mandatory.10  The Court’s retreat was a response to lower courts’ 
difficulty applying the mandatory Saucier framework.11  It was also a 
response to a growing body of criticism of Saucier, perhaps none more 
influential than that of our co-panelist, Judge Pierre Leval.12
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
  Heeding that 
**  Law Clerk to the Honorable Helen Meyer, Minnesota Supreme Court. 
 1. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 201 (2001)). 
 2. See id. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); id. at 232 
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 3. 533 U.S. 194. 
 4. Id. at 200. 
 5. Id. at 200, 202. 
 6. Id. at 201. 
 7. 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999). 
 8. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 236. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 234–35. 
 12. Id. (citing Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:  Dicta About Dicta, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275, 1277 (2006)). 
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criticism, Pearson made the two-step framework optional.  The Pearson 
Court instructed that lower courts “exercise their sound discretion” in 
determining which of the Saucier prongs to address first and the necessity 
of analyzing both prongs instead of the determinative one alone.13
Functionally, Pearson gave courts four options for adjudicating qualified 
immunity cases.  Under Saucier, qualified immunity cases could be 
resolved in only three ways: 
 
 
Type A: Prong One: no constitutional 
violation, and  
 Prong Two: a fortiori, qualified 
immunity 
 
 
→ Defendant wins. 
Type B: Prong One: constitutional violation, 
but 
 
 Prong Two: qualified immunity 
 
→ Defendant wins. 
Type C: Prong One: constitutional violation, 
and 
 
 Prong Two:  no qualified immunity → Plaintiff wins. 
 
By rendering Prong One optional, Pearson created a fourth ruling: 
 
Type D: Prong One: skipped with no holding, 
and 
 
 Prong Two:  qualified immunity → Defendant wins. 
 
The Type D alternative renders Type A and B rulings purely optional and 
discretionary.  Under Pearson, courts issuing a Type A or B ruling could 
issue a Type D ruling instead.  Type A and B rulings, however, involve 
“unnecessary” decisions on Prong One—whether the defendant’s conduct 
violated the law—because in all such cases, the result is the same.  When a 
court issues a Type A, B, or D ruling, the defendant wins on Prong Two—
whether the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.  The difference has 
to do with future cases.  Prong One rulings may set broad precedent for 
future cases, while Prong Two rulings do not (or at least they have much 
narrower precedential effect).  In other words, Type A and B rulings have 
prospective effect—“unnecessary” prospective effect—while Type D 
rulings do not.  Saucier mandated prospective rulings; Pearson made them 
optional. 
In this Essay, we seek to assess whether and why lower courts exercise 
that option.  We seek to provide preliminary answers to two questions.  
First, to what extent are lower courts exercising their discretion to issue 
prospective rulings?  In other words, to what extent are lower courts 
 
 13. Id. at 236. 
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choosing Type A or B rulings, and to what extent are they choosing Type D 
rulings?  Second, what motivates courts to choose one type over another?  
In other words, why do courts issue Type A or B rulings when they could 
choose Type D, and vice versa? 
To answer these questions, we examined every published circuit court 
case citing Pearson during the calendar years 2009 and 2010.  The universe 
consisted of 190 cases.  Our findings suggest that in most cases, lower 
courts continue to follow the sequenced Saucier framework and continue to 
issue Prong One rulings even when they are not necessary to the result.  Our 
findings also suggest that lower courts generally choose from available 
options based on the same sort of pragmatic concerns identified in Pearson.  
On the whole, lower courts’ application of Pearson has not been 
particularly political, nor has it been driven by theoretical worries about 
dicta and advisory opinions. 
I.  LOWER COURTS’ DESCRIPTIONS OF PEARSON 
Lower courts have described their new Pearson-derived discretion in 
varying terms.  Some cases suggest that optional Prong One rulings are 
disfavored, while other cases suggest that they are favored.  Put differently, 
some cases suggest that courts should generally issue Type D non-
prospective rulings when possible, while others suggest that they should 
generally issue Type A or B prospective rulings. 
The language of Pearson itself was almost studiously neutral—the 
Supreme Court’s retreat from Saucier was cautious.  The Court noted that it 
would still be beneficial to use the Saucier order in many cases, and 
reiterated that Saucier’s prescribed order would promote the development 
of precedent.14  Analyzing qualified immunity per Saucier’s sequence 
remained “especially valuable with respect to questions that do not 
frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is 
unavailable.”15  The Court thus suggested that unnecessary Type A and B 
rulings would be valuable in many instances.  On the other hand, the Court 
also noted that an optional framework was preferable for many reasons:  it 
would conserve judicial resources, avoid decisions based on an 
underdeveloped record, and decrease the occurrence of decisions with no 
opportunity for appellate review.16  Therefore, the Court suggested that 
Type D rulings would be prudent in many instances.17
Pearson’s even-handed treatment of Saucier left courts uncertain about 
how to characterize the relationship between the two cases.  Courts even 
use varying labels to describe Pearson’s relation to Saucier in citations.  
Many courts parenthetically cite Pearson as overruling Saucier in part.
 
18
 
 14. Id. 
  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 236–41. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Lutchel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilkinson v. 
Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010); Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1022 
(9th Cir. 2010); Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798, 805 (8th Cir. 
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Others say it abrogated Saucier.19  The Ninth Circuit explained that 
Pearson “receded from” Saucier.20
Their textual descriptions of the Pearson-Saucier relationship are equally 
diverse.  Most contain more nuance than simply calling Saucier overruled.  
Some cases describe Pearson as relaxing Saucier’s requirements.
 
21  Others 
portray the relationship as one of modification.22  Taking a more animated 
approach, the Tenth Circuit wrote that Pearson “jettisoned” Saucier’s 
holding that courts must rule on whether the alleged rights were violated 
before ruling on whether they were clearly established.23  The same Circuit 
also described Pearson as “discard[ing]” Saucier’s “mechanical[]” 
approach.24  In contrast, some courts have emphasized how much Pearson 
left unchanged.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that Pearson “reaffirmed the 
long-established standard for qualified immunity” and only removed a 
requirement as to order.25
A few cases suggested reading Pearson as giving a firm prescription for 
one type of ruling over another.  In two separate opinions, for example, 
Tenth Circuit Judge Timothy Tymkovich declared he was “tak[ing] the 
advice of Pearson” and declining to analyze whether a complaint alleged a 
constitutional violation.
 
26  In each case, the district court had denied the 
defendants’ claims of qualified immunity.27  Judge Tymkovich recognized 
that Courts of Appeals needed to address both prongs to affirm the ruling, 
but only one to reverse it.28
Following Pearson’s lead, however, most circuit court explanations of 
Pearson’s effect are neutral in tone.
  Having decided at the outset to reverse the 
lower courts’ determination that the officer did not have immunity, Judge 
Tymkovich leaned on the “advice” of Pearson in focusing on Prong Two 
alone. 
29  One representative court explained 
that Pearson allows courts to “bypass the initial step” in the qualified 
immunity analysis.30
 
2010); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009); Collier v. Montgomery, 
569 F.3d 214, 217 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2009). 
  Another court focused on the fact that Pearson allows 
courts the “analytical flexibility” to focus on the determinative prong of 
 19. See, e.g., Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010); Rohrbough v. Hall, 
586 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 20. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 610 F.3d 877, 883 n.8 (5th Cir. 2010); Kennedy v. 
City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 22. See, e.g., Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 526 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 23. Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1277 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 24. Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 25. McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 26. Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, 577 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010); see also 
Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Swanson, 577 F.3d at 1199). 
 27. See Clark, 625 F.3d at 689; Swanson, 577 F.3d at 1199. 
 28. See Clark, 625 F.3d at 690 (quoting Swanson, 577 F.3d at 1199). 
 29. See, e.g., Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2010); Nielander v. 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009); Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. 
of Regents, 616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 30. Cortés-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 608 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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qualified immunity, which sometimes means an analysis of Prong One is 
unnecessary.31  Courts’ appreciation for the flexibility that Pearson granted 
them is evident in the frequent citations to Pearson’s “sound discretion” 
language.32  The D.C. Circuit waxed positive on “the Pearson option,” 
finding that Saucier made constitutional questions unavoidable, which is no 
longer the case under Pearson.33  The Fifth Circuit expressed its gratitude 
for the Pearson “short-cut,” which relieves courts from “undertaking the 
often more difficult task of determining” constitutional violations.34  The 
Seventh Circuit likewise expressed appreciation for its new ability to 
“sidestep” constitutional questions where appropriate.35
In sum, while a few cases suggest that Pearson favors one approach over 
the other, most circuits have maintained that Pearson is neutral.  The 
developing body of circuit case law mostly suggests that Prong One is 
optional and discretionary, and that courts should neither favor nor disfavor 
optional prospective rulings. 
 
II.  LOWER COURTS’ STATISTICAL USE OF VARIOUS OPTIONS                
UNDER PEARSON 
A.  Methodology 
To assess lower courts’ use of the new Pearson framework, we examined 
every published circuit court case citing Pearson during the calendar years 
2009 and 2010.  We excluded cases citing Pearson for reasons unrelated to 
qualified immunity.  That left 205 cases citing Pearson in cases presenting 
questions of qualified immunity.  We then classified those cases into one of 
the four types of qualified immunity rulings described above. 
Although most cases were easily classified into one of the four types, 
some cases could not be classified for various reasons.  For example, some 
cases involved multiple claims of various violations or multiple defendants, 
which were not all resolved the same way.  In such cases, a court might 
allow some claims to proceed, but dismiss others under either Prong One or 
Prong Two.  In such “mixed” cases, if a certain type of result predominated, 
we classified the case as that type; if no particular type predominated, we 
excluded it from the sample. 
Additionally, some courts essentially merged the two prongs, making it 
difficult or impossible to classify which prong was outcome-determinative.  
For example, in cases centering on alleged illegal searches and seizures, 
which turned on the existence of probable cause, some courts stated that the 
ultimate resolution depended on whether there was “arguable probable 
cause.”36
 
 31. Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). 
  Technically, the Prong One analysis requires that an officer have 
 32. See, e.g., Krainski, 616 F.3d at 968; Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
 33. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 34. Morgan v. Swanson, 627 F.3d 170, 176 n.8 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 35. Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 36. See, e.g., Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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actual probable cause, while the Prong Two analysis requires only arguable 
probable cause.  In practice, courts occasionally combine the two prongs.  
The resulting rulings suggested that an officer had actual probable cause 
with a conclusion of this sort:  “[W]e find that [the officer] had, at 
minimum, arguable probable cause to issue the arrest affidavit of the 
Plaintiff.”37
B.  Overall Rates of Ruling Types 
  A few such cases were also excluded from the sample.  After 
excluding a small percentage of these unclassifiable cases, we were left 
with a usable universe of 190 cases. 
Of those 190 cases that could be classified, the overall usage of the four 
possible rulings after Pearson was as follows: 
 
Table 1:  Post-Pearson Rulings by Type38
Type A: 
 
Prong One: no constitutional 
violation, and 
  
 Prong Two: a fortiori, qualified 
immunity 
 
 
→ Defendant wins. 
 
34.7% 
Type B: Prong One: constitutional 
violation, but 
  
 Prong Two: qualified immunity 
 
→ Defendant wins. 7.9% 
Type C: Prong One: constitutional 
violation, and 
  
 Prong Two:  no qualified 
immunity 
 
 
→ Plaintiff wins. 
 
37.9% 
Type D: Prong One: skipped with no 
holding, and 
  
 Prong Two: qualified immunity → Defendant wins. 19.5% 
 
Of course, Type C rulings are substantially irrelevant to the questions 
addressed in this Essay because Pearson did not alter them in any important 
way.  A ruling that a defendant violated clearly established law in Prong 
Two necessarily involves a ruling that the defendant violated that law in 
Prong One.  Simply put, when a court rules for the plaintiff, it must reach 
the first prong.  Because Type C rulings do not involve any Pearson-
derived discretion, we can exclude them to focus on the universe of cases 
that do. 
The relevant universe includes Type A, B, and D rulings—i.e., cases 
where the defendant prevailed.  Within that universe, the overall usage of 
each type broke down as follows: 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson Survey Results 
(unpublished spreadsheet) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
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Table 2:  Post-Pearson Results Excluding Type C Rulings39
Type A: 
 
55.9% 
Type B: 12.7% 
Type D: 31.4% 
 
Thus, in cases where courts had an option of issuing a ruling on Prong 
One, they exercised that option in approximately two-thirds of cases.  In 
other words, about 68.6% of such cases (Type A plus Type B) resulted in 
unnecessary prospective rulings, and about 31.4% skipped directly to Prong 
Two.  On the whole, it appears that courts continued to follow the Saucier 
sequence most of the time, although they exercised their Pearson discretion 
in a substantial minority of cases. 
 C.  Rates by Party Affiliation 
We next attempted to discern whether judges’ political affiliation had a 
discernible effect on their use of the various qualified immunity ruling 
types.40
 
  Among circuit panels with a majority of Republican-appointed 
judges, the overall usage rates were: 
Table 3:  Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority                                   
of Republican-Appointed Judges41
Type A: 
 
37.1% 
Type B: 6.4% 
Type C: 36.4% 
Type D: 20.0% 
 
Excluding Type C cases, panels controlled by Republican appointees had 
the following rates: 
 
Table 4:  Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority                                     
of Republican-Appointed Judges, Excluding Type C Rulings42
Type A:   
 
58.4% 
Type B: 10.1% 
Type D: 31.5% 
 
For panels with a majority of Democrat-appointed judges, the overall 
rates were: 
 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. Of the 190 cases included in these results, 145 were decided by panels with a 
majority of Republican appointees and 60 were decided by panels with a majority of 
Democrat appointees. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
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Table 5:  Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority                                   
of Democrat-Appointed Judges43
Type A:   
 
28.0% 
Type B: 12.0% 
Type C: 42.0% 
Type D: 18.0% 
 
Considering only cases involving Pearson discretion, panels controlled 
by Democratic appointees ruled as follows: 
 
Table 6:  Post-Pearson Results by Panels with a Majority                                      
of Democrat-Appointed Judges, Excluding Type C Rulings44
Type A: 
 
48.3% 
Type B: 20.7% 
Type D: 31.0% 
 
Thus, Republican-appointee-controlled panels issued unnecessary Prong 
One rulings in 68.5% of cases and Democratic-appointee-controlled panels 
issued them in 69.0% of cases.  That difference does not appear significant.  
The greatest distinction was that Democratic-appointed judges appeared to 
be more likely to find that a defendant violated the law (i.e., Type B plus 
Type C).  Democratic-appointee-controlled panels found Prong One 
violations in 54.0% of cases, while panels controlled by Republican 
appointees found them in 42.9% of cases.  Even that statistical difference, 
however, is fairly small. 
III.  STATED RATIONALES AND EXAMPLES OF VARIOUS TYPES 
A.  Rationales for Exercising Pearson Discretion 
We next examined lower courts’ stated rationales for either issuing or 
forgoing a Prong One ruling.  Overall, their rationales were pragmatic and 
grounded in the Supreme Court’s guidance in Pearson.  Circuit courts have 
been particularly willing to issue unnecessary Prong One rulings in 
situations where there was a paucity of precedent on the constitutional issue 
presented and the need for such a ruling seemed great. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit followed the Saucier order in al-Kidd v. 
Ashcroft.45  It explained that Saucier’s sequence was “especially valuable in 
addressing constitutional questions” that would not only arise infrequently, 
but would likely be resolved by qualified immunity precisely due to the 
lack of pertinent case law.46
 
 43. See id. 
  There, the court considered the 
constitutionality of former Attorney General John Ashcroft’s decision to 
confine United States citizens pursuant to the Federal Material Witness 
 44. See id. 
 45. 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 46. Id. at 964. 
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Statute, without charging them with any crimes.47  Although the court 
eventually decided that Ashcroft was not protected by any kind of 
immunity, the court decided that it should confront the Prong One issue—
regardless of the resolution of Prong Two—to provide guidance to future 
courts confronted with similar legal issues.48
Other circuit panels also have deemed the Saucier order appropriate in 
other cases of first impression.  For example, a different Ninth Circuit panel 
used the Saucier framework because it had not previously addressed 
whether police could rely on the statement of a very young victim as the 
sole fact supporting their seizure of a suspected child molester.
 
49  Another 
panel found it beneficial to follow the Saucier sequence to address, for the 
first time, the constitutional standards governing an in-school seizure of a 
student allegedly abused by her father.50
The Second Circuit has similarly employed the Saucier order to advance 
the development of the law.  In Kelsey v. County of Schoharie,
   
51 the court 
chose to answer the threshold inquiry about the constitutionality of clothing 
exchange procedures in jails, even though it was not required to do so.52  
Although many district courts in the circuit had spoken on the issue, the 
Court of Appeals had not, and it decided to confront the issue because 
development of constitutional precedent was important.53  The court was 
aware that the issue may never be settled if it were to continually hold that 
the law was not clearly established and grant defendants immunity on that 
ground.54
Considering Prong One did not burden the Kelsey court because the 
discussion of one prong necessarily overlapped with the other.
 
55  The court 
noted that there was no reason to abstain from performing the Prong One 
analysis since analyzing the reasons why the law was not clearly established 
also demonstrated why no violation was alleged.56  Other courts also have 
determined that the Saucier order actually saved them time—a rejoinder to 
those who say discarding the two-part test is a huge boon for judicial 
resources.  The Seventh Circuit reported that the Saucier order “facilitates 
. . . expeditious disposition” in certain cases.57
Courts skipping Prong One have likewise justified their decision to do so 
with the pragmatic reasons that Pearson endorsed.  They quite frequently 
explained this choice in terms straight out of Pearson, and collectively they 
have used nearly every rationale the Supreme Court relied on in overturning 
 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 50. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part by 131 S. 
Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 51. 567 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 52. Id. at 61. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 61–62. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Akande v. Grounds, 555 F.3d 586, 590 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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the mandatory nature of Saucier.  Some circuit panels explained that, given 
the freedom to address either prong first, they simply focused on the 
determinative one.58  The Eleventh Circuit expressed a belief that analyzing 
Prong Two only was the “‘best [way to] facilitate the fair and efficient 
disposition’ of [the] case.”59  These explanations both fall in line with 
Pearson’s remonstrance to save time and money for the parties and courts 
where possible.60  The First Circuit avoided Prong One in Cortés-Reyes v. 
Salas-Quintana61 because it would have been called upon to draw uncertain 
conclusions about Puerto Rican law.62  The court based its refusal on 
Pearson’s admonishment that the goal of developing the law is not 
advanced when a federal court must make assumptions about state law to 
resolve constitutional issues.63  The Seventh Circuit found that a Prong One 
analysis would serve no jurisprudential purpose because the analysis in that 
case would be complicated by its “quirky facts” and, as such, would 
provide little guidance for future cases.64  Lower courts have also drawn on 
Pearson’s constitutional avoidance rationale.65  The Sixth Circuit relied on 
Pearson’s discussion of challenging procedural postures in Koubriti v. 
Convertino.66  Pearson had noted that “the precise factual basis for the 
plaintiff’s claim . . . may be hard to identify” at the time an appellate court 
rules on qualified immunity.67  In Koubriti, the Sixth Circuit declined to 
address the Prong One question because it had “not been developed in the 
lower court record.”68
Some circuit courts have been willing to admit that, given the freedom to 
do so, they simply “bypass the more difficult question,” which is often 
whether a constitutional right was violated in Prong One.
 
69  Despite the 
value of developing the law, there are many situations where courts simply 
avoid creating new law.  This was the case for the Eleventh Circuit when it 
confronted the extent of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in email 
content.70  The court noted there were few circuit decisions regarding 
Fourth Amendment protection of email content and that the Supreme Court 
had not spoken on privacy expectations in electronic communications.71
 
 58. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
  
 59. Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Decosta, 587 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009)). 
 60. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237. 
 61. 608 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 62. See id. at 51–52. 
 63. See id. at 51 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 238). 
 64. Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 65. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We thus follow the 
‘older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such 
adjudication is unavoidable.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. 
at 241)). 
 66. 593 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 67. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 238–39. 
 68. Koubriti, 593 F.3d at 471. 
 69. Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 70. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 846 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 71. See id. at 843–44. 
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The court concluded that the prudent choice was to decline to set precedent, 
particularly because it would not be essential to the outcome of the case.72
To attempt to answer Saucier’s first question would require us to opine on 
an open and significant issue of constitutional law on an inadequate 
record, without benefit either of a district court holding or of relevant 
briefing, even though the issue would have no effect on the outcome of 
the case.  We therefore exercise our newfound discretion and move on.
  
The Tenth Circuit perhaps summed it up best: 
73
B.  Example:  Type B 
 
Type B holdings are the least frequent of the four post-Pearson types.74  
It is relatively rare for courts to find that a defendant violated the law but 
also that the defendant is entitled to immunity.  At least occasionally, 
however, circuit courts take that path, which is where the “prospective-
only” aspect of Saucier is most obvious.  Type B rulings essentially hold 
that this particular defendant escapes without liability, but all future 
defendants who engage in similar conduct will be liable.75
Stoot v. City of Everett was one such case.
  Some courts 
explicitly choose this prospective option. 
76  The mother of a four-year-
old girl, A.B., reported to the police that her daughter had been sexually 
abused by a fourteen-year-old boy, Paul Stoot.77  An officer, Jensen, 
responded to the call and interviewed A.B. about the alleged abuse.78  
Jensen determined that A.B.’s story was credible and, without further 
investigation or corroboration, headed to Stoot’s school to seize and 
interrogate him.79  Stoot later alleged that the interrogation at the school 
was coercive—that Jensen threatened him, offered incentives for Stoot to 
confess, and engaged in “blaming the victim” strategies designed to elicit 
inculpatory statements.80  Stoot eventually gave in and confessed to several 
acts of sexual abuse against A.B.  Jensen had Stoot write and sign a 
confession.81
The district court eventually dismissed all charges against Stoot, finding 
both that the confession was coerced and that A.B. was not credible.
 
82  
Stoot’s family then filed a § 1983 suit, claiming several constitutional 
violations, including that Jensen seized Stoot without probable cause in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.83
 
 72. See id. at 846. 
  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the law was not clearly established such that Jensen was on notice that 
 73. Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 74. See supra tbl.1. 
 75. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 76. 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 77. Id. at 913. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 914–15. 
 80. Id. at 915–17. 
 81. Id. at 915. 
 82. Id. at 916–17. 
 83. Id. at 917. 
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his actions were unlawful, entitling him to qualified immunity.84  Along the 
way to this holding, however, the court took a purposeful path to clarify the 
law.  Because the court had not previously ruled on whether a statement of 
a very young victim of alleged sexual abuse could establish probable cause 
on its own, the court chose to address the issue under Prong One.85
To resolve this issue of first impression, the court first relied on 
precedent holding that crime victims’ statements cannot alone support a 
finding of probable cause if the victims are not reasonably trustworthy or 
reliable.
 
86  Applying this rule to the new fact scenario—a very young 
victim of alleged sexual abuse—the court found three factors weighed 
against the trustworthiness of A.B.’s statement.87  First, A.B. was only four 
years old and the abuse was alleged to have taken place over a year before it 
was reported.88  Second, A.B. changed her answers several times 
throughout the interview with Jensen.89  Third and finally, A.B. confused 
Stoot with another boy during Jensen’s interview.90  Taken together, these 
three factors swayed the court’s determination that A.B.’s testimony was 
not trustworthy enough to establish probable cause on its own.91  Thus 
Jensen seized Stoot without probable cause and in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.92
Although the court did not set a bright-line rule against the reliability of 
child victim statements, the analysis provides guidance for future courts 
faced with probable cause determinations based on child victim statements.  
The court also used the Stoot case as an opportunity to distinguish Tenth 
Circuit precedent on the same issue.  Jensen had relied on Easton v. City of 
Boulder
 
93 to support his claim that internally conflicting statements of child 
victims can establish probable cause.94  Easton similarly involved an 
allegation of child sexual abuse where the suspect’s seizure was based, in 
part, on the victim’s statements.95  When Easton brought suit challenging 
the reliability of the statement used by police, the Tenth Circuit held that 
reliance on the victim’s statements was reasonable despite internal 
inconsistencies.96  Moreover, the Easton Court repudiated a per se rule that 
statements of very young child victims cannot be relied upon in probable 
cause determinations.97
 
 84. Id. at 922. 
  Jensen attempted to cite Easton for the proposition 
that police may reasonably rely solely on a child victim’s partially 
 85. Id. at 918 n.8. 
 86. Id. at 919. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 920. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 921. 
 93. 776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 94. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 920. 
 95. Easton, 776 F.2d at 1443–46. 
 96. Id. at 1449. 
 97. Id. 
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conflicting statements.98  The Stoot court recognized that Easton did so 
hold, but decided the Tenth Circuit case was distinguishable on the basis of 
corroboration.99  In Easton, the police had corroborating evidence in the 
form of another child’s statement, physical evidence, and information about 
Easton himself.100  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that Easton was of 
no avail to Jensen, who sought a holding that uncorroborated child victim 
statements alone sufficed for probable cause.101
By taking the time to explicate Prong One in Stoot, the Ninth Circuit 
demonstrated exactly what Saucier promoted—and what Pearson 
potentially lost.  The court found Jensen was immune to the Fourth 
Amendment challenge because the Stoots could cite no case law putting 
him on notice that his actions were unlawful.
  Easton did not go that far, 
according to the Ninth Circuit. 
102  The Ninth Circuit could 
have rested the entire decision there.  Instead, by creating new law, the 
court essentially put every other officer in the circuit on notice that relying 
only on uncorroborated and unreliable statements of very young sexual 
abuse victims to establish probable cause is a constitutional violation, and 
qualified immunity would no longer protect them if they did that.  Perhaps 
the decision to analyze Prong One in Stoot was political, because the circuit 
panel was controlled by Democrat appointees and our survey demonstrated 
a slight Democratic-appointee preference for finding that officers 
committed constitutional violations.103
C.  Example:  Type D 
  Perhaps the panel sought to restrain 
the actions of police officers by delineating a new constitutional rule.  
Regardless, it is clear that the court made a purposeful choice to clarify the 
law. 
Of the cases we studied, just over one-third resulted in a Type D ruling.  
These courts chose to exercise the freedom Pearson gave them and avoid 
the Prong One analysis entirely.  Christensen v. Park City Municipal 
Corp.104 is a representative example of a Type D case.  Shaun Christensen 
was a visual artist who attempted to display and sell his artwork on public 
property in Park City, Utah.105  Christensen was arrested for violating a city 
ordinance requiring a license to conduct business outdoors.106
 
 98. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 921. 
  After the 
charges against Christensen were eventually dropped, he filed a civil suit 
 99. Id. 
 100. Easton, 776 F.2d at 1443–44. 
 101. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 921. 
 102. Id. at 922. 
 103. Compare supra tbl.5 (showing that Democrat-appointee-dominated panels found 
constitutional violations in 54.2% of cases—both Type B and C rulings), with supra tbl.3 
(demonstrating that Republican-appointee-dominated panels found such violations in only 
43.6% of cases). 
 104. 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 105. Id. at 1273–74. 
 106. Id. at 1274. 
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against the city and the arresting officers claiming a violation of his First 
Amendment right to display and sell artwork.107
The district court dismissed Christensen’s claims against the individual 
officers.
 
108  First, the court found that Christensen’s complaint failed to 
state a claim because he did not specify the type of artwork at issue.109  
Then, the court denied Christensen leave to amend his complaint because 
the law governing the officers’ conduct was not clearly established at the 
time of the arrest.110  Therefore, qualified immunity would protect the 
officers from liability even if Christensen remedied the specificity 
problem.111  The district court held that it “‘need not determine the exact 
parameters of the First Amendment protection for the sale of expressive 
artwork because of the [complaint’s] vagueness’” and the inevitability of 
qualified immunity.112  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling that 
Christensen’s complaint did not adequately allege the nature of his 
artwork.113  Like the district court, however, the circuit court refused to 
address the possibility of a First Amendment violation because it “would 
have been very difficult to do that here.”114
The difficulties were both legal and practical.  Legally, it was unclear 
which framework applied to Christensen’s First Amendment claim.
 
115  The 
district court analyzed the violation under the standard set forth in Bery v. 
City of New York.116  Under Bery, artwork that falls within the same 
categories as paintings, photographs, prints, or sculptures receives First 
Amendment protection as presumptively expressive artwork.117  Because 
the district court and all the parties had assumed that Bery applied,118 the 
court dismissed Christensen’s First Amendment claim because it could not 
discern from the complaint whether his artwork fell into one of the Bery 
categories.119  The Tenth Circuit was not convinced that Bery was the 
proper standard, however.120  It suggested that the Park City ordinance’s 
prohibitions against selling expressive artwork may be better analyzed “as 
restrictions on expressive conduct [under United States v. O’Brien121] 
rather than speech.”122  The court even noted that some constitutional 
analysis other than Bery and O’Brien may apply.123
 
 107. Id. 
  Because the parties 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (quoting Order at 6, Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-202 (D. 
Utah Sept. 15, 2006)). 
 113. Id. at 1276. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 1276–77. 
 116. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996); see Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1276. 
 117. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696; see Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1275. 
 118. Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1276. 
 119. Id. at 1274. 
 120. Id. at 1276–77. 
 121. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 122. Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1277. 
 123. Id. 
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assumed Bery applied, they had not briefed the issue and thus the court 
could not easily determine the proper standard.124
Practically, this legally complicated issue was exacerbated by logistical 
problems with Christensen’s case.  Because the parties had not submitted 
briefs on the other legal standards, the court could not determine how they 
would apply.
 
125  For example, the O’Brien standard, unlike Bery, 
considered the governmental purposes served by the regulation and the 
alternative channels of communication available to Christensen.  The 
parties’ focus on Bery meant that the court would be faced with an 
inadequate record on which to examine those two factors if it had 
determined that O’Brien was the correct framework for analyzing the 
ordinance.126  The Tenth Circuit thought it was fortunate that Pearson had 
recently obviated the need to analyze Prong One.127  The court indicated 
that Christensen’s case served as an example of when Pearson discretion 
should be exercised.128  The court found that “[i]t would serve no practical 
purpose for us to delve any deeper into the First Amendment principles 
applicable to this case. . . .  [F]urther analysis of the merits would have no 
actual consequence for the litigants.”129  Instead, the court chose to analyze 
Prong Two alone because it was determinative and relieved the court of the 
need to opine on a “significant issue” of constitutional law without the 
benefit of briefing or a fully formed record.130  Perhaps the Christensen 
court’s choice to avoid Prong One could be explained by the judges’ 
political affiliations—the panel was comprised entirely of Republican 
appointees131 and our research revealed that those judges demonstrated a 
slight preference for avoiding unnecessary Prong One rulings.132
IV.  COMPARISON WITH CASES DECIDED UNDER SAUCIER 
  
Nevertheless, the court may have been on target in asserting that the 
Christensen case was precisely the sort of situation the Pearson Court 
sought to avoid—forcing courts to rule on important constitutional issues in 
challenging procedural postures when the result would be non-dispositive. 
A.  Statistical Use of Various Options Under Saucier and Pearson 
Relying on previous work by other scholars, we can compare courts’ use 
of the various ruling types under the Saucier framework with their use 
under the Pearson framework.  As we discussed above, Saucier permitted 
courts to issue only Type A, B, and C rulings, but Pearson enabled them to 
issue Type D rulings. 
 
 124. Id. at 1276–77. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1277. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1278. 
 129. Id. at 1277. 
 130. Id. at 1278. 
 131. See id. at 1273 (noting that panel consisted of Circuit Judges Terrence O’Brien, 
Wade Brorby, and Michael W. McConnell). 
 132. Compare supra tbl.3, with supra tbl.5. 
638 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Several scholars have previously conducted statistical analyses of the 
courts’ rulings under the Saucier framework.  These scholars’ 
methodologies varied somewhat, as did their results, but overall they 
reached roughly consistent conclusions.  Paul Hughes examined 158 
published appellate cases decided in 2005 under the Saucier framework,133 
Nancy Leong analyzed 155 such cases decided in 2006 and 2007,134 and 
Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg analyzed 355 such cases decided 
between 2001 and 2008.135
 
  Their results are summarized and averaged in 
the following table: 
Table 7:  Summary of Previous Studies’ Results 
 Hughes136 Leong 137
Sobolski & 
Steinberg 138 Average 139
Type A: 
 
42.2% 61.9% 43.6% 47.5% 
Type B: 10.2% 6.5% 13.9% 11.3% 
Type C: 46.4% 26.5% 36.5% 36.5% 
Type D: 1.2% 4.5% 5.9% 4.5% 
 
Two aspects of their collective findings bear particular emphasis.  First, 
even though Saucier purported to mandate consideration of Prong One—
and thus Type D rulings were not allowed—lower courts still occasionally 
issued Type D rulings before Pearson.  In other words, in a small but non-
trivial number of cases, lower courts ignored Saucier and refused to issue 
Prong One rulings.140
Using averages of previous studies, we can compare Saucier-era results 
to our Pearson-era results: 
  Second, despite Saucier’s focus on enabling Type B 
rulings—with their purely prospective adjudications of constitutional 
rights—lower courts employed that option relatively rarely.  All three 
empirical analyses of Saucier-era cases found that the great majority of 
cases—around 80%—were either Type A or Type C. 
 
 133. Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment:  Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the 
Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 422–23 (2009). 
 134. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment:  An Empirical Analysis, 
36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 711 (2009). 
 135. Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 
Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 
545 (2010). 
 136. Hughes, supra note 133, at 423 tbl.1. 
 137. Leong, supra note 134, at 711 tbl.4. 
 138. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 135, at 545–46 tbls.1 & 2. 
 139. These averages are intended to serve as rough estimates for the purposes of 
comparing these authors’ findings with our own.  They have been weighted according to the 
number of cases each study surveyed, but they do not account for the authors’ varying 
methodologies or any overlap in the cases examined. 
 140. Saucier’s mandate, of course, applied equally to district courts and circuit courts. See 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001) (indicating that the order was an “instruction to 
the district courts and courts of appeals”); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195, 
198 & n.3 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that the court of appeals followed the Saucier 
sequence and that the Court was not “reconsider[ing] [its] instruction in Saucier” in that 
case). 
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Table 8:  Comparison of Saucier-era and Pearson-era Results 
 Saucier141 Pearson 142 Change  
Type A: 47.5% 34.7% -12.8% 
Type B: 11.3% 7.9% -3.4% 
Type C: 36.5% 37.9% +1.4% 
Type D: 4.5% 19.5% +15.0% 
 
The percentage of Type B and C rulings changed only to a small extent, 
while the percentage of Type A and D rulings changed substantially.  These 
results suggest that lower courts under Pearson have not only employed 
Type D rulings much more frequently, but more importantly, they suggest 
Type D rulings occurred in cases where the courts otherwise would have 
issued a Type A ruling.  In other words, under Saucier, there were more 
cases in which courts issued a Prong One ruling stating that the defendants 
had not violated the law, which created harmful precedent for future 
plaintiffs and helpful precedent for future defendants.  Under Pearson, there 
were more cases where courts avoided setting any precedent for future 
cases.  Because these latter Type D rulings appear to have come largely at 
the expense of Type A rulings, Pearson has had the counterintuitive effect 
of helping plaintiffs and hurting defendants. 
Moreover, these conclusions are generally consistent with those reached 
earlier by Nancy Leong.  After comparing cases decided under Saucier with 
cases decided before Saucier, Leong found that Saucier produced “virtually 
no change in the percentage of cases where courts held that a constitutional 
violation had taken place and a striking increase in the percentage of cases 
where courts held that no constitutional violation had taken place.”143  She 
concluded that “the constitutional questions avoided pre-Saucier are now 
almost uniformly decided in defendants’ favor.”144   In other words, she 
found that Saucier caused lower courts to substitute Type A rulings for 
Type D rulings.  Our study confirms her findings on Saucier’s effect.  The 
Supreme Court’s repudiation of the mandatory sequence in Pearson has 
allowed lower courts to revert to their pre-Saucier practice:  substituting 
Type D rulings for Type A rulings.  Leong’s and our conclusions, however, 
are not fully consistent with those of Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg.  
Although they found that “the transition from pre- to post-Saucier 
corresponds to an observable increase in frequency of rights-restricting 
holdings in which a court holds the plaintiff has not successfully alleged a 
constitutional violation [i.e., Type A rulings],” they concluded that “such 
changes [were] not statistically significant.”145
Ultimately, it may be too early to tell what the effect of Pearson will be.  
What seems clear, however, is that the shift from Saucier to Pearson was 
 
 
 141. See supra tbl.7. 
 142. See Sampsell-Jones & Yauch, supra note 38. 
 143. Leong, supra note 134, at 690. 
 144. Id. at 693. 
 145. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 135, at 547. 
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not an unambiguous victory for government official defendants.  Pearson 
may have had little effect, or indeed it may have benefited citizen plaintiffs.  
Regardless of Pearson’s ultimate effect, it should not be taken as evidence 
that we have a Supreme Court bent on limiting the constitutional rights of 
American citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
As a political matter, Pearson has been alternately hailed and criticized 
as a victory for government official defendants over citizen plaintiffs.  
Academic commentators have generally assumed that, in the long-run, 
Pearson will result in substantially less tort liability for official lawbreakers 
because courts will decline to address Prong One issues, and thus officials 
will remain indefinitely immune because the law will never be clearly 
established. 
In reality, such assumptions may be substantially unfounded, and some 
of the criticisms overblown.  In most cases, courts continue to follow the 
ordered Saucier framework even where they are not required to do so.146  In 
cases where courts exercised their Pearson discretion and skipped the 
Prong One merits analysis, they often do so because the case presents 
quirky facts or odd questions of law with limited precedential value.147  
Moreover, the data suggest that Democratic-appointed judges are both 
somewhat more likely to rule in plaintiffs’ favor and to issue optional Prong 
One rulings.148
Conversely, Pearson has proven not to be a great victory for Saucier’s 
critics.  Those critics had argued that Saucier required courts to write dicta 
and issue unconstitutional advisory opinions.
  In its application, therefore, the optional Pearson 
framework has demonstrated a small amount of self-selection bias favoring 
citizen plaintiffs. 
149  Under Pearson, however, 
courts generally do the same thing.  Courts still regularly issue Type A and 
B rulings,150
In sum, our analysis of the post-Pearson qualified immunity decisions in 
the circuit courts suggests that not much has changed.  Pearson reads like a 
 both of which involve constitutional rulings that are 
technically unnecessary and therefore dicta—at least under certain 
(arguably naive and untenable) definitions of dicta.  While Pearson has 
been cited as a general endorsement of the constitutional avoidance canon, 
the fact remains that most lower courts violate that canon regularly under 
Pearson.  Pearson has not stopped courts from issuing the very type of 
prospective rulings that led critics to attack Saucier. 
 
 146. See supra tbls.1 & 2. 
 147. See supra notes 58–73 and accompanying text. 
 148. Compare supra tbls.5 & 6, with supra tbls. 3 & 4. 
 149. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 847, 851–53, 876–881 (2005); Leval, supra note 12, at 1277; see also Melissa 
Armstrong, Note, Rule Pragmatism:  Theory and Application to Qualified Immunity 
Analysis, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 107, 123–28 (2004) (assessing analytic and 
functional arguments for considering such unnecessary rulings dicta). 
 150. See supra tbl.1. 
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fairly limited qualification of the Saucier framework, and for the most part, 
lower courts have applied it in that spirit.151  Pearson suggests that in 
certain cases, courts should forgo rulings on the merits, but Pearson also 
continues to endorse the use of optional rulings on the merits in order to 
clarify the law for future cases.152  Pearson allows lower courts to continue 
issuing prospective rulings in cases where it makes sense to do so.153  That 
is precisely what lower courts have done.154
 
 
 
 151. See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text; see also tbl.1. 
